5pr.md (7580B)
1 At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with 2 the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the 3 reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the 4 nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much 5 more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my design to 6 point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected, nor 7 to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due 8 performance of its functions. The latter question lies in the province of 9 Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I 10 shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show 11 the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and 12 moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already 13 shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our 14 will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were 15 compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to 16 confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate 17 them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember 18 rightly) of two dogs, the one a house–dog and the other a hunting–dog. For by 19 long training it could be brought about, that the house–dog should become 20 accustomed to hunt, and the hunting–dog to cease from running after hares. To 21 this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul 22 or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that 23 part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel 24 all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, 25 and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various 26 ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, 27 that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, 28 that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different 29 manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many 30 different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external 31 objects which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if 32 the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already 33 been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, 34 the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them 35 to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position 36 of the gland. He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united 37 in nature to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone 38 desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the 39 eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of the 40 dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about 41 the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the 42 animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract 43 the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the 44 pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he 45 maintained that, although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been 46 united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our 47 thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet it can nevertheless become 48 through habituation associated with other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove 49 in the Passions de l'âme, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so 50 weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its 51 passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or 52 disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which 53 (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some 54 movement of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27). But, seeing that we can 55 join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, 56 the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, 57 we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we 58 wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which we 59 wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion 60 over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so 61 far as I gather it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less 62 ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, 63 I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would 64 draw no conclusions which do not follow from self–evident premisses, and would 65 affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so 66 often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through 67 occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are 68 commonplace. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the 69 body? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate 70 union with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to 71 explain this union through its proximate cause. But he had so distinct a 72 conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any 73 particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but was 74 obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. 75 Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart 76 to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in 77 ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the 78 mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which 79 we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom 80 by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly 81 intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of 82 boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a 83 way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away. In 84 truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no 85 comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of 86 the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by 87 the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable 88 in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in 89 so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the 90 cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes 91 concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that 92 his premisses are false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown 93 above, is defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the 94 knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all 95 have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and 96 from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to 97 the mind's blessedness. 98 99