5p7d.md (1176B)
1 We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the 2 emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, 3 being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the 4 said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is 5 referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a 6 nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV. 7 vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort 8 controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its 9 external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from 10 reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things 11 (see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always 12 regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their 13 present existence), and which we always conceive in the same 14 manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always 15 remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which 16 are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external 17 causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more, 18 until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the 19 emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D. 20 21