5p5d.md (653B)
1 An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be 2 free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be 3 necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one 4 towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.). 5 But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to 6 conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes 7 whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note); 8 therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply 9 is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel 10 towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, 11 consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D. 12 13