ethica

Spinozas ethics and various translations, edited for easy post processing.
git clone https://git.repetitions.de/ethica

5p4csc.md (2345B)


 1 Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
 2 an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
 3 understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
 4 (II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
 5 distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
 6 absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
 7 about, that he should become less subject to them.  To attain
 8 this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
 9 acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
10 every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
11 be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
12 distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
13 that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
14 external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
15 it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
16 destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
17 are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
18 being excessive (IV. lxi.).  For it must be especially remarked,
19 that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
20 that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
21 For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
22 that everyone desires his fellow–men to live after his own
23 fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
24 reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
25 does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
26 by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
27 called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof).  In like
28 manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
29 they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
30 accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
31 adequate ideas.  For all desires, whereby we are determined to
32 any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
33 inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).  Than this remedy for the emotions
34 (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
35 a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
36 our power, can be devised.  For the mind has no other power save
37 that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
38 above (III. iii.).
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