4pr.md (7590B)
1 Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I 2 name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is 3 not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much 4 so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better 5 for him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what 6 is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part 7 of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make a 8 few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good 9 and evil. 10 11 When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has 12 brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, 13 not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks 14 that he knows, the intention and aim of its author. For 15 instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not 16 yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work 17 is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will, 18 on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is 19 carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it. 20 But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen 21 before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he 22 plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. 23 Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms. 24 25 But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out 26 types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain 27 types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that 28 which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the 29 thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree 30 less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently 31 been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. 32 This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena, 33 which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or 34 imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things 35 natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they 36 hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing 37 without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types 38 before herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature, 39 which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they 40 have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has 41 fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. 42 Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect 43 or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true 44 knowledge of what they pronounce upon. 45 46 Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does 47 not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite 48 Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as 49 that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same 50 necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I. 51 xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the 52 reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does 53 not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the 54 sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is 55 neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final 56 is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered 57 as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say 58 that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we 59 mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of 60 household life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, the 61 being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is 62 nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the 63 efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because 64 men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. They 65 are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions 66 and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are 67 determined to any particular desire. Therefore, the common 68 saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and 69 produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses 70 treated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and 71 imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or 72 notions which we form from a comparison among one another of 73 individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def. 74 vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For 75 we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one 76 genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category 77 of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. 78 Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this 79 category, and comparing them one with another, find that some 80 possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent, 81 say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as 82 we attribute to them anything implying negation–as term, end, 83 infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because 84 they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call 85 perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or 86 because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope 87 of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity 88 of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from 89 the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily 90 comes to pass. 91 92 As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive 93 quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of 94 thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things 95 one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same 96 time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for 97 him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is 98 deaf, it is neither good nor bad. 99 100 Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be 101 retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a 102 type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful 103 for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have 104 indicated. 105 106 In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we 107 certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the 108 type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by 109 "bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in 110 approaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are more 111 perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more 112 or less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially 113 remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a 114 greater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is 115 changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a 116 horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a 117 man, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we 118 conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is 119 understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly, 120 by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality–in 121 other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and 122 operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to 123 its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect, 124 because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration 125 of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence 126 of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence; 127 but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will 128 always be able to persist in existence with the same force 129 wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all 130 things are equal. 131 132