4p59d.md (1474B)
1 To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def. 2 ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the 3 necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is 4 bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action 5 (IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any 6 action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance 7 of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a 8 man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this 9 extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we 10 could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, 11 pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for 12 it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is 13 increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in 14 so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent 15 of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his 16 actions (III. iii., and note). 17 18 Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to 19 such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception 20 of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, 21 capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion 22 wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable 23 to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv. 24 explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing 25 else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. 26 Q.E.D. 27 28