4p37sc2.md (4052B)
1 In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain 2 praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice. 3 4 Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note: 5 the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I 6 must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature 7 and in society. 8 9 Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, 10 consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions 11 which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by 12 sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is 13 bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own 14 disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to 15 him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which 16 he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now, 17 if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain 18 in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to 19 his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a 20 prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue 21 (IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and 22 being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in 23 need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that 24 men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is 25 necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for 26 the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure 27 their fellow–men. The way in which this end can be obtained, so 28 that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv. 29 Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each 30 other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV. 31 vii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only 32 be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to 33 itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of 34 incurring a greater injury themselves. 35 36 On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps 37 in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging 38 injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also 39 possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to 40 pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in 41 restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a 42 society established with laws and the power of preserving itself 43 is called a State, while those who live under its protection are 44 called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the 45 state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced 46 good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely 47 of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with 48 reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good 49 or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself. 50 51 In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it 52 can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on 53 by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State 54 authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is 55 therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on 56 the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is 57 thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages 58 which a State provides. 59 60 Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent 61 master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be 62 said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are 63 common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no 64 wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that 65 which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the 66 state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas 67 are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common 68 consent what belongs to one man and what to another. 69 70 From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and 71 injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes 72 which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough. 73 74