4p37sc1.md (2890B)
1 He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause 2 others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the 3 world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, 4 and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight 5 in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar 6 impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what 7 pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men 8 under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be 9 possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love 10 it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they 11 delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who 12 endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but 13 courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. 14 Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in 15 so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to 16 Religion. The desire of well–doing, which is engendered by a 17 life according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, 18 whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate 19 others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by 20 honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according 21 to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the 22 gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are 23 the foundations of a state; and the difference between true 24 virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have 25 said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in 26 accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but 27 man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to 28 himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded 29 by the general disposition of things rather than by his own 30 nature considered solely in itself. 31 32 [13] Honestas 33 34 Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii. 35 of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the 36 slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition 37 and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of 38 what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of 39 associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts, 40 or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the 41 same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. 42 Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men 43 have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. 44 Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we 45 may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, 46 treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature 47 is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from 48 human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain 49 what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points 50 see the following note. 51 52