ethica

Spinozas ethics and various translations, edited for easy post processing.
git clone https://git.repetitions.de/ethica

4p18sc.md (3572B)


 1 In these few remarks I have explained the causes of
 2 human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide
 3 by the precepts of reason.  It now remains for me to show what
 4 course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are
 5 in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are
 6 contrary thereto.  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions
 7 in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
 8 briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my
 9 meaning.
10 
11 As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,
12 that every man should love himself, should seek that which is
13 useful to him–I mean, that which is really useful to him, should
14 desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,
15 and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to
16 preserve his own being.  This is as necessarily true, as that a
17 whole is greater than its part.  (Cf. III. iv.)
18 
19 Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance
20 with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one
21 endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with
22 the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the
23 foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own
24 being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving
25 his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its
26 own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful
27 to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and
28 lastly, that suicides are weak–minded, and are overcome by
29 external causes repugnant to their nature.  Further, it follows
30 from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing
31 without all external things for the preservation of our being or
32 living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside
33 ourselves.  Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
34 intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
35 understand nothing besides itself.  There are, then, many things
36 outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to
37 be desired.  Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than
38 those which are in entire agreement with our nature.  For if, for
39 example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,
40 they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them
41 singly.
42 
43 Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than
44 man–nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being
45 can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points
46 agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,
47 one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
48 one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
49 being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
50 Hence, men who are governed by reason–that is, who seek what is
51 useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
52 nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
53 and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
54 conduct.
55 
56 Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
57 briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
58 detail.  I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
59 the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
60 man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
61 of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
62 
63 Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
64 case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
65 have hitherto proceeded.
66 
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