4p13d.md (716B)
1 In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are 2 not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the 3 existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other 4 hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its 5 present existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation 6 to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls 7 the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and 8 note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II. 9 xvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing 10 contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is 11 fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a 12 thing past. Q.E.D. 13 14