4p12cd.md (653B)
1 Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, 2 is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as 3 future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the 4 future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV. 5 x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of 6 existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far 7 fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is, 8 nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as 9 contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard 10 as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the 11 thing to be present with us. Q.E.D. 12 13