3p59sc.md (3266B)
1 All actions following from emotion, which are 2 attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set 3 down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into 4 courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By 5 courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve 6 his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. 7 By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours, 8 solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to 9 unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, 10 which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to 11 courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to 12 highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind 13 in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c., 14 are varieties of highmindedness. 15 16 I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their 17 primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, 18 which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, 19 to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I 20 have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external 21 causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds 22 we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I 23 have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting 24 emotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the 25 same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to 26 repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from 27 what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with 28 another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise 29 therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However, 30 for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most 31 important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be 32 more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning 33 love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a 34 thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment, 35 acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another 36 way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind 37 begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when 38 we conceive something which generally delights us with its 39 flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we 40 are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is 41 otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus 42 otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be 43 stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be 44 stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel 45 repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the 46 presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become 47 odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or 48 weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward 49 modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for 50 instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these 51 are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the 52 mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be 53 supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them, 54 interpolating such observations as I think should here and there 55 be added. 56 57