ethica

Spinozas ethics and various translations, edited for easy post processing.
git clone https://git.repetitions.de/ethica

3p52sc.md (2463B)


 1 This mental modification, or imagination of a
 2 particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
 3 Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
 4 Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
 5 in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
 6 think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.  If,
 7 however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
 8 anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
 9 regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
10 otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
11 the emotion is called Horror.  Again, if it be the prudence,
12 industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
13 love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
14 joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.  We may in
15 like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
16 emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
17 to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
18 ordinary speech.  Whence it is evident, that the names of the
19 emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
20 ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
21 nature.
22 
23 To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
24 the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
25 fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
26 to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
27 we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
28 determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from
29 the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
30 we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
31 of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
32 thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
33 which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
34 the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
35 particularly to regard that which is therein.  As devotion
36 springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
37 spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
38 from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
39 Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
40 in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
41 emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
42 recognized name.
43 
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