ethica

Spinozas ethics and various translations, edited for easy post processing.
git clone https://git.repetitions.de/ethica

3p51sc.md (2169B)


 1 We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
 2 loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
 3 not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
 4 once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
 5 Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
 6 what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
 7 follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
 8 emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we
 9 distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
10 style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.
11 For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
12 which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into
13 consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
14 benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
15 an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
16 daring.  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
17 evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take
18 into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
19 an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
20 he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
21 
22 [10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
23 intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
24 
25 Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
26 judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
27 emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
28 pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
29 are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
30 things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that
31 a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
32 with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we
33 can easily understand what are Repentance and Self–complacency.
34 Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
35 cause; Self–complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
36 one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
37 men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).
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