3p2sc.md (8488B)
1 This is made more clear by what was said in the note to 2 II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing, 3 conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under 4 the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or 5 concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived 6 under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of 7 states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in 8 nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the 9 mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we 10 proved II. xii. 11 12 Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no 13 further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is 14 proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the 15 question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it 16 is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in 17 motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending 18 solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought. However, 19 no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the 20 body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what 21 the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far 22 as she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained such 23 an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can 24 explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact 25 that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far 26 transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things 27 in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake: 28 these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole 29 laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at. 30 31 Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the 32 body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the 33 body, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say that 34 this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which 35 latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without 36 meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are 37 ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at 38 it. 39 40 But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means 41 whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate, 42 experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit 43 state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we have 44 experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or 45 are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly, 46 we say depend on the mind's decree. But, as to the first point, 47 I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach, 48 that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted 49 for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind 50 simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of 51 thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I 52 think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the 53 mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given 54 subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for 55 being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is 56 the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object. 57 58 But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the 59 laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be 60 able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of 61 that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the 62 human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be 63 capable of building a single temple. However, I have just 64 pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the 65 body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration 66 of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things 67 being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would 68 never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: 69 such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and 70 wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call 71 attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses 72 in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to 73 repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under 74 whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. 75 As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be 76 much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they 77 are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern 78 anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything 79 more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many 80 believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we 81 moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be 82 controlled by the thought of something else frequently 83 remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what 84 we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be 85 allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless 86 such persons had proved by experience that we do many things 87 which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when 88 assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the 89 worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we 90 are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own 91 free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely 92 desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires 93 to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from 94 the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he 95 would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a 96 garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe 97 that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they 98 are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. 99 Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men 100 believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious 101 of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those 102 actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the 103 dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and 104 therefore vary according to the varying state of the body. 105 Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who 106 are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish; 107 those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this 108 way or that. All these considerations clearly show that a mental 109 decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are 110 simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call 111 decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the 112 attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is 113 regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the 114 laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in 115 the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to another 116 point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind, 117 unless we have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, we 118 cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so. 119 Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or 120 forget a thing at will. Therefore the freedom of the mind must 121 in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering 122 something which it remembers. But when we dream that we speak, 123 we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we 124 do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the 125 body. Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we 126 seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby 127 we keep silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly, 128 we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something, 129 which we should not dare to do when awake. 130 131 Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two 132 sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? 133 If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must 134 necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is 135 believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination 136 or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an 137 idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. 138 xlix.). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind 139 by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. 140 Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or 141 act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream 142 with their eyes open. 143 144