3p22sc.md (741B)
1 Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we 2 may define as pain arising from another's hurt. What term we can 3 use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not. 4 5 We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on 6 another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures 7 another, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, that 8 we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown 9 in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto 10 regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles 11 ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval 12 on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and, 13 contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury. 14 15