3p11sc.md (2601B)
1 Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, 2 and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, 3 sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states 4 of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. 5 By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall 6 signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater 7 perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the 8 mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of 9 pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call 10 stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of 11 pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy. 12 But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are 13 attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected 14 than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike 15 affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to 16 Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other 17 primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other 18 emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I 19 should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this 20 part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is 21 contrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the 22 idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the 23 existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it 24 follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii., 25 that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the 26 fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. 27 Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of 28 the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends 29 on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. 30 Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its 31 power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to 32 affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the 33 mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the 34 mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases 35 to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the 36 existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist; 37 therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the 38 existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but 39 (II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes 40 the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, 41 and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the 42 essence of our mind. 43 44