ethica

Spinozas ethics and various translations, edited for easy post processing.
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 1 Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called lust. These last
 2 five emotions (as I have shown in III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference
 3 is a species of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.
 4 
 5 Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and chastity
 6 indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind. It may, nevertheless,
 7 happen, that an avaricious, an ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess
 8 in eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear are
 9 not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For an avaricious man
10 often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man's expense. An
11 ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his
12 indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
13 from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a
14 timid man does that which he would not. For though an avaricious man should, for
15 the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less
16 remain avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he cannot
17 follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention, cease to be lustful.
18 In fact, these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting,
19 drinking, &c., as with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be
20 opposed to these emotions, but high–mindedness and valour, whereof I will speak
21 presently.
22 
23 The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass over in
24 silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already
25 described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows
26 that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge
27 of them. However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which
28 we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or,
29 rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be
30 called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and
31 extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions,
32 and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able
33 thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
34 
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