3ad32e.md (901B)
1 When we remember a thing, we are by that very 2 fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to 3 contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something 4 present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, 5 is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the 6 existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember 7 something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that 8 very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of 9 pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once 10 checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence 11 of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly 12 speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from 13 the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as 14 the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion 15 down, among the emotions springing from desire. 16 17