3ad1e.md (1763B)
1 We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of 2 this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; 3 further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is 4 determined to act in a way tending to promote its own 5 persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, 6 strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite 7 and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or 8 not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to 9 avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from 10 explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it 11 in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those 12 endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms 13 appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said, 14 that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived 15 as determined to a particular activity; but from such a 16 definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can 17 be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to 18 imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add, 19 in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c. 20 For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every 21 disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be 22 innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of 23 thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, 24 lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. 25 By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, 26 impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each 27 man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to 28 another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and 29 knows not where to turn. 30 31