2p49csc.md (13911B)
1 We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error. For we have 2 shown above, that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved 3 in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch 4 as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that a man 5 acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not 6 say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces 7 in what is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his 8 imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the man be assumed to 9 acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by 10 certainty we mean something positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the 11 absence of doubt. 12 13 However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained, I will 14 draw attention to a few additional points, and I will furthermore answer the 15 objections which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to 16 remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while to point out some of the 17 advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will be better 18 appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part. 19 20 I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate 21 distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind, and the images of things 22 which we imagine. It is further necessary that they should distinguish between 23 idea and words, whereby we signify things. These three–namely, images, 24 words, and ideas–are by many persons either entirely confused together, 25 or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people are 26 generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine 27 of the will, both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. 28 Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact 29 with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, 30 whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which 31 we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they 32 were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not 33 see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or 34 negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation 35 which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they 36 feel, affirm, or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who 37 reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the 38 conception of extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being 39 a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The 40 essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise 41 involve the conception of thought. 42 43 These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to 44 consider the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine. 45 46 Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider 47 scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom. The 48 reason for their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the 49 understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an increase in 50 their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent 51 to an infinity of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need of an 52 increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from 53 the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. 54 55 Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially 56 clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things 57 which we perceive; this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be 58 deceived, in so far as he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents 59 or dissents. For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore 60 admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits 61 in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught 62 more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and 63 different from the faculty of understanding. 64 65 Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain 66 more reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for 67 affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that 68 what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or 69 perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so 70 also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems to 71 point to a difference between the understanding and the will. 72 73 Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will 74 happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of 75 Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I 76 shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an 77 actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, 78 and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. 79 80 Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence 81 everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting 82 those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible. 83 84 To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope 85 than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct 86 ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the 87 faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should 88 be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by 89 the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after 90 the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can 91 we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite 92 number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which 93 we cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any 94 thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be 95 urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be 96 obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater 97 faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to say that, if 98 God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of 99 other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater 100 understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have 101 already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a 102 universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions–in 103 other words, that which is common to all such volitions. As, then, our opponents 104 maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it 105 is little to be wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself 106 into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for what is universal 107 is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals. 108 109 To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of 110 suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone suspends his judgment, we 111 merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question 112 adequately. Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a 113 perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose 114 a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination 115 involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not 116 perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will 117 necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its 118 existence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily experience of such 119 a state of things in dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who 120 would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending 121 his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that he 122 should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, 123 notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we 124 dream that we are dreaming. 125 126 Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception 127 extends–that is, I grant that the mind's imaginations, regarded in 128 themselves, do not involve error (II. xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does 129 not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception 130 of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the mind could 131 perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as present 132 to itself: it would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty 133 of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which 134 precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the 135 idea which it possess of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will 136 either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in 137 doubt on the subject. 138 139 I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection, namely, that 140 the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and that it 141 only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose 142 adequate essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the 143 abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not 144 in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's essence: for, in this 145 respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. 146 For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from 147 that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle 148 differs from the idea of a triangle. 149 150 Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power of thinking, 151 to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is 152 false is true. These two affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same 153 relation to one another as being and not–being; for there is nothing 154 positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood (II. xxxv. 155 note, and xlvii. note). 156 157 We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we confuse 158 universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with 159 realities. As for the fourth objection, I am quite ready to admit, that a man 160 placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger 161 and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) 162 would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an one should not 163 rather be considered an ass than a man; I answer, that I do not know, neither do 164 I know how a man should be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should 165 consider children, fools, madmen, &c. 166 167 It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as 168 bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The 169 doctrine is good, 170 171 1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and 172 to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform 173 more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not 174 only completely tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest 175 happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby 176 we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly 177 understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who 178 expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their 179 best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the 180 service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom. 181 182 2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to 183 the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our power, and do not 184 follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should await and endure 185 fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow 186 from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the 187 essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. 188 189 3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, 190 neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as 191 it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his 192 neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely 193 by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I 194 will show in Part III. 195 196 4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it 197 teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, 198 but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best. 199 200 I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I thus 201 bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein 202 explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, 203 considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have 204 laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the 205 highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be 206 partly made plain. 207 208