2p48sc.md (1534B)
1 In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind 2 no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. 3 Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either 4 entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms, 5 such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things. 6 Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to 7 this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to 8 this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The cause 9 which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in 10 the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would 11 here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the 12 faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby 13 the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire, 14 wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing. 15 After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general 16 notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular 17 instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether 18 volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things. 19 We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any 20 affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as 21 it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following 22 proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should 23 suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are 24 formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but 25 the conceptions of thought. 26 27