2p44c1sc.md (2480B)
1 How this way of looking at things arises, I will 2 briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.) 3 that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even 4 though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which 5 exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we 6 showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two 7 external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards 8 imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway 9 remember the other–that is, it will regard both as present to 10 itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence 11 and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from 12 the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than 13 others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us 14 suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in 15 the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that 16 today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from 17 II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he 18 will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the 19 sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other 20 words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his 21 imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he 22 will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon–that 23 is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation 24 to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the 25 evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by 26 imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past 27 time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other 28 evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on 29 the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening 30 sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the 31 child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, 32 not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, 33 with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first 34 one, then the other–that is, he will imagine them in the future, 35 neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This 36 wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination 37 be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in 38 relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may 39 imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time 40 present, past, or future. 41 42