2p43sc.md (2484B)
1 I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by 2 the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing 3 proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a 4 true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest 5 certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression 6 for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, 7 indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is 8 something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of 9 thinking–namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, 10 can know that he understands anything, unless he do first 11 understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a 12 thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can 13 there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a 14 standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and 15 darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity. 16 17 I think I have thus sufficiently answered these 18 questions–namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false 19 idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a 20 true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea 21 (since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark); 22 consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any 23 advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes 24 it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure, 25 that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These 26 questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently 27 answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is 28 plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to 29 the latter as being is to not–being. The causes of falsity I 30 have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the 31 note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man 32 who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made 33 apparent. As for the last question–as to how a man can be sure 34 that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just 35 pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises 36 from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with 37 its object–in other words, that truth is its own standard. We 38 may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is 39 part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.); 40 therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as 41 necessarily true as the ideas of God. 42 43