2p40sc1.md (4085B)
1 I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, 2 which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our 3 ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or 4 notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this 5 method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more 6 useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at 7 all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all 8 men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who 9 are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are 10 ill–founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called 11 secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on 12 which they are founded, and other points of interest connected 13 with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the 14 subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another 15 treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by 16 too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything 17 necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence 18 are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, 19 Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the 20 human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming 21 a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the 22 II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number 23 be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this 24 number of images, of which the body is capable of forming 25 distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become 26 entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident 27 (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind 28 can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body 29 can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite 30 confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies 31 confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as 32 it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of 33 Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact 34 that images are not always equally vivid, and from other 35 analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for 36 the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to 37 consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms 38 represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar 39 causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, 40 horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many 41 images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the 42 human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed 43 utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small 44 differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and 45 their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in 46 which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by 47 them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said 48 individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses 49 by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of 50 particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to 51 imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, 52 bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all 53 men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the 54 point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and 55 which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, 56 those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of 57 man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect 58 stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other 59 attribute, will form a different general image of man, for 60 instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two–footed animal 61 without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, 62 everyone will form general images of things according to the 63 habit of his body. 64 65 It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, 66 who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed 67 of them, so many controversies should have arisen. 68 69