2p17csc.md (2236B)
1 We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, 2 that we regard as present many things which are not. It is 3 possible that the same result may be brought about by other 4 causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated 5 one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out 6 the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the 7 truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which 8 rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be 9 controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human 10 body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). 11 Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly 12 understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of 13 Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the 14 idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The 15 former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and 16 only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter 17 indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature 18 of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body 19 lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even 20 though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual 21 phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the 22 ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call 23 the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of 24 things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say 25 that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in 26 order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the 27 mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind 28 does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as 29 it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the 30 existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If 31 the mind, while imagining non–existent things as present to it, 32 is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this 33 power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its 34 nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of 35 imagination depend solely on its own nature–that is (I. Def. 36 vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free. 37 38