1p33sc2.md (5961B)
1 It clearly follows from what we have said, that 2 things have been brought into being by God in the highest 3 perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a 4 most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in 5 God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its 6 contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just 7 shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been 8 brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to 9 God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute 10 to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being. 11 12 I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and 13 will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply 14 because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very 15 different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They 16 assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also 17 convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly 18 weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject 19 such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, 20 but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is 21 no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop. 22 xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further, 23 that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of 24 God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things 25 could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a 26 different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what 27 our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely 28 on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If 29 it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. 30 Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all 31 eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be 32 convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no 33 such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely 34 from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never 35 could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist 36 before his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is 37 said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had 38 ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and 39 her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in 40 God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his 41 decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature 42 and her order, different from those which he has ordained–in 43 other words, if he had willed and conceived something different 44 concerning nature–he would perforce have had a different 45 intellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But 46 if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a 47 different will, without any change in his essence or his 48 perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the 49 decrees which he has made concerning created things, and 50 nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will 51 concerning things created and their order are the same, in 52 respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived. 53 54 Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that 55 God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as 56 they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's 57 essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a 58 different actual intellect and a different will, his essence 59 would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at 60 first, if things had been brought into being by God in a 61 different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and 62 will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have 63 been different, which is absurd. 64 65 As these things could not have been brought into being by God 66 in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as 67 the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection 68 of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to 69 believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were 70 in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he 71 had understood them. 72 73 But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor 74 imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be 75 called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the 76 will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it 77 about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection, 78 and vice versâ. What is such an assertion, but an open 79 declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he 80 wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should 81 understand things differently from the way in which he does 82 understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height of 83 absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its 84 employers, as follows:–All things depend on the power of God. 85 In order that things should be different from what they are, 86 God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God's 87 will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly 88 demonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither can 89 things be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects 90 all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that 91 they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth 92 than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all 93 things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter 94 persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not 95 depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, 96 or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another 97 name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter 98 absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first 99 and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of 100 their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting 101 such wild theories. 102 103