1p17c2sc.md (5429B)
1 Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, 2 as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have 3 said follow from his nature–that is, which are in his power, 4 should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But 5 this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, 6 that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its 7 three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; 8 or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is 9 absurd. 10 11 Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this 12 proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's 13 nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, 14 that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature; 15 for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can 16 attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in 17 ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually 18 supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring 19 into existence everything which he actually understands, for they 20 think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they 21 contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he 22 would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, 23 would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to 24 asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates 25 nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute 26 exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown 27 sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme 28 power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things–that is, 29 all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of 30 ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as 31 from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for 32 eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right 33 angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from 34 all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state 35 of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to 36 God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For, 37 otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an 38 infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able 39 to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would, 40 according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render 41 himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is 42 perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, 43 that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power 44 extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most 45 repugnant to God's omnipotence. 46 47 Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the 48 will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain 49 to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some 50 significance quite different from those they usually bear. For 51 intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, 52 would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human 53 intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with 54 them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence 55 between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly 56 constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will 57 prove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it 58 cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, 59 posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, 60 inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality 61 (Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal 62 essence of things is as it is, because it exists by 63 representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the 64 intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute 65 God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their 66 essence and of their existence. This seems to have been 67 recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect, 68 God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As, 69 therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, 70 both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ 71 from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its 72 existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely 73 in the quality which the latter gains from the former. 74 75 For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, 76 but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, 77 therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but 78 must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of 79 one of them cease, the existence of the other will not 80 necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be 81 destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be 82 destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of 83 the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ 84 from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in 85 respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause 86 both of the essence and the existence of our intellect; 87 therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to 88 constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in 89 respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in 90 anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The 91 reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone 92 can easily see. 93 94